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Abstract We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an an-
archic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an
external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon
has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles
the role of the ‘big-man’ in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members’
contributions to collective output and the payments from the big-man to these members
seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly selfish
preferences.
Keywords Free-riding · Collective action · Anarchy · Distributional conflict · War ·
Norms · Big-man
JEL Classification D72 · D74 · H11 · H41
1 Introduction
Anthropologists have studied governance regimes for a variety of primitive societies. Sahlins
(1963) described a particularly interesting structure for a number of Melanesian tribes.1 In
these tribes ordinary members provide productive services, whereas a wealthy player (the
1Similar governance structures and the importance of generous “wealthy men” are reported, for instance,
for the Kapauku Papuans by Benson (1988).
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‘big-man’) is involved in extensive and unconditional gift giving.2 Sahlins’s report about a
functioning state-less society which coped with the problem of collective good provision
and internal peace is the starting point of our analysis. While Sahlins interprets some of
the activities among members of the tribe as governed by reciprocity, we analyse a non-
cooperative game that adopts key elements of Sahlins’s report, but does not follow Sahlins’s
interpretation of exchange as reciprocal behavior. Instead, we develop a structure that has a
non-cooperative equilibrium in which members of the stateless society3 (the ‘clan’ in what
follows) make efficient contributions to collective action and abstain from internal fighting.
Our approach reveals that what has been seen as evidence of reciprocating behavior (Sahlins
1963: 293) may simply be a sequence of actions in a subgame perfect equilibrium among
narrowly selfish players. Norms about adequate contributions to group output and adequate
wealth distributions play the role of coordination devices that allow players to choose this
efficient equilibrium from among a set of equilibria. Hence, although our clan formally lives
in a state of anarchy, it avoids internal conflict and achieves a self-enforcing solution to the
public good provision problem.
The cornerstones of our game are as follows. Clan members first decide on their contri-
butions to the collective action. Then one member may decide to make donations to other
group members. We may call this player the ‘big man’. The big man does not control any
enforcement technology, but he has a sufficient amount of wealth to be able to make consid-
erable donations. Then the members of the group decide whether to fight inside the group.
At this stage there are multiple equilibria, with a peaceful and a most resource wasteful fight-
ing equilibrium among these. Behavior on earlier stages triggers the choice of equilibrium
in this later stage as follows. If the members of the organization make contributions and the
‘big-man’ makes donations that are in accordance with what the members of the organiza-
tion consider appropriate, then all members of the organization may choose to abstain from
internal conflict.4 If single members’ contributions to the collective good differ from what
is considered appropriate, this upsets the other members. Donations will not be distributed
and the resource wasteful regime emerges. Similarly, if all group members make adequate
contributions to group output, but the big man’s donations differ from what is considered
adequate, then the organization will also end up in a wasteful conflict. Intuitively, antici-
pation of the wasteful regime as the consequence of neglecting one’s own collective action
duties or of inadequate donations may give each member of the organization an incentive
to choose the adequate collective action and the ‘big man’ to make adequate donations. The
fear of possible fighting and resource wasting conflict inside the organization can, hence,
stabilize a fully efficient outcome in a static game.
2Orenstein et al. (1980: 71) also emphasizes the importance of material wealth as a key qualification
for a ‘big man’ in this society.
3Such societies existed for long periods and in many regions. Leeson (2006) lists and categorizes a consider-
able number of such primitive societies and provides references that describe them.
4Our theory and in particular use of the term “norm” follows Hardin‘s influential view, that “an important
fact about many norms is that behaviors they guide may be strongly reinforced by incentives of self-interest”
(Hardin 1995: 22), which makes norms the subject of consequentialist analysis. This view is in stark contrast
to, e.g., Elster, who claims that norms are not outcome-oriented (Elster 1989). In our non-cooperative game
set-up behavior according to a norm gets reinforced by individual self-interest, while at the same time it is
in the self-interest of any individual to have a (group) norm. Hardin‘s further, more concrete observation that
“many norms appear to have the strategic structure of coordination” (Hardin 1995: 73) also pertains to our
model: the power of a group is greatly enhanced by the efficient coordination of individual efforts, which is
achieved through the role of a clan leader, who also has (an incentive) to submit to the norm.
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Our analysis has several distinctive features. First, we do not rely on an infinitely repeated
game framework, in which an efficient equilibrium results from purely strategy-induced
dynamics.5
Second, all members of the group receive some—not necessarily the same—share in
the group’s income in the equilibrium. This share can be seen as a compensation for the
member’s contribution to collective action, but is not part of a formal contract. It is paid in a
way that does not involve any promise or commitment by the recipient and is not motivated
by other-regarding preferences or a desire for reciprocating. Third, group size is meaningful.
Larger groups are more effective in generating group income. However, the clan’s per-capita
payoff is typically maximized for an intermediate clan size. Finally, the framework offers an
explanation for why some organizations, clans, groups, or primitive states perform very well
whereas others perform very badly. The analysis provides an example of the functioning,
importance and implicit enforcement of norms: the implementation of the efficient collective
action requires all players to have a common view about their appropriate contribution to the
collective good and about what would be an appropriate or equitable distribution of rents.
Compliance with this norm is reinforced by self-interest. Deviation from this norms by a
single player would induce a shift from one equilibrium to another, less attractive one in
a later stage. Hence the alignment of the norm with individual self-interest works twofold:
self-interest is instrumental in stabilizing the norm, and the norm is instrumental in asserting
self-interest.
2 Related literature
We distinguish several lines of literature that are strongly related to our analysis. First, the
questions we address are related to the oldest and most fundamental questions that can be
traced back to theories of early constitutional philosophers about anarchy, the power of co-
ercion and the origin of property rights and the state. It is impossible to survey this literature
here. A recent survey that focuses on the role of public choice theory on understanding the
economics of anarchy is by Powell and Stringham (2009), showing that there are multiple
reasons why a stateless economy may, but need not perform reasonably well, and identify
forces that may stabilize its status or transform it into different forms of governance. Skaper-
das (1992), Hirshleifer (1988, 1995) and Grossman (1994) analyzed economic behavior in
the absence of property rights, where players choose between production of consumable out-
put and appropriation effort, which may consist of stealing, arming or guarding, implying
considerable inefficiency. Their work stimulated a major research program.6 Considerable
research effort has also been devoted to the origin of a state with its rules of enforcement
that may overcome the inefficiencies that apply in anarchy. Leeson (2006) distinguishes two
5Although our threat of punishment through Nash equilibrium reversion is similar to the one employed in
repeated games, it also works in institutional set-ups with high discount rates and finite time horizons. A key
aspect that is emphasized in many works on cooperation in the absence of formal enforcement is repeated in-
teraction. Tullock (1972) already emphasizes it as a facilitator of trade in the absence of formal enforcement.
A further example of spontaneous economic order is the development of securities trading in Amsterdam.
Stringham (2003) analyses this phenomenon and highlights the importance of reputation and repeated in-
teraction. Benson (1989) discusses several key aspects that were important for how and why commercial
law could evolve as a spontaneous means to settle dispute. The importance of the option to terminate the
(potentially fruitful) interaction is highlighted by Kurrild-Klitgaard (2002).
6See, for instance, Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for an overview.
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types of theories in this context: social contract theories that build on the consensus of play-
ers and explore the role of a commitment technology7 and predatory theories in which a
player with considerable enforcement power implements cooperation.8 The comprehensive
survey by Powell and Stringham (2009) emphasizes that in many of these theories repeated
interaction is a key aspect that stabilizes a cooperative or conflictless outcome. Our approach
shows that internally peaceful and fully efficient group behavior can be the equilibrium out-
come of a fully non-cooperative non-repeated game. We do not resort to a collective decision
which provides this enforcement nor to an ultimate provider of enforcement with formal en-
forcement technologies. We show that collectively efficient and peaceful behavior within a
group, organization or clan nevertheless can emerge. Conflict itself becomes the key driver
in this process as the absence of enforcement institutions leads to a multiplicity of equilib-
ria, some of which involve costly conflict and some of which do not. The norm allows the
distribution of a “peace dividend” in an equilibrium without conflict, which emerges from
efficient collective action and from abstention from fighting. A “bad” equilibrium is selected
if players do not behave according to the norms.
Second, gift giving and gift exchange have been documented for a number of stateless
societies and their instrumental role for explaining cooperative behavior or contract enforce-
ment has been carefully studied (see, e.g., Landa 1994). Perhaps the most commonly known
reciprocal gift-giving system is the ‘potlatch’ among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians. In this
system economically successful players celebrated big feasts in which they transferred con-
siderable resources to other players as gifts. Johnsen (1986) interprets this system and the
status norms it is based on as means of reducing violent conflict between tribes and for al-
7Only a few recent examples are given here: De Meza and Gould (1992) consider a framework in which each
player decides on whether to enforce property rights using his own resources. Private enforcement causes
externalities. They study the implications of these externalities for equilibrium and welfare. Falkinger (2006)
considers the non-cooperative investment in a punishment mechanism that enforces contracts. Sánchez-Pagés
and Straub (2006) explain the endogenous emergence of norm enforcement institutions by agents’ voluntary
costly contributions to their formation. An enforcement technology is given, but players must still agree
to adopt and use it. Once this decision is made and the enforcer of property rights is appointed, he uses
this power benevolently and does not opportunistically abuse this power. Fearon (2008) suggests democratic
elections as a device for collectively governing the governor: the group of players may give the power to
enforce property rights when he interacts with single individuals. The group may, however, retain the ability
to replace the ruler if it can coordinate on collective action (for instance, a revolution). Democratic elections,
and whether they take place as they should and in an orderly fashion, are used as a coordination device for
whether the ruler should be kept in power, or whether it is time for a collective action to replace the ruler.
Gradstein (2007) analyses the relationship between income distribution, democratic choice of property rights
regimes and growth performance. A majority decision enforces the property rights regime in his framework.
Unanimous or majoritarian adoption of institutions has strong intuitive appeal. However, we would like to
go one step further and provide an explanation for collectively efficient behavior which is self-enforcing in
a fully non-cooperative equilibrium. Leeson (2008) emphasizes the adoption of desirable trading partners’
behavioral or religious practices and gift-giving as ways to establish cooperation in contexts of repeated
interaction in some African societies.
8Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996) analyzed the welfare outcome if a king or sovereign ruler
has access to a power monopoly and can enforce property rights. A power monopoly may improve upon
the situation with anarchy, provided that the ruler can commit himself to abstain from ex-post opportunistic
behavior. Long-term considerations and the forces of infinitely repeated play may, but need not overcome
what several writers identified as the fundamental problem with an agent who has the power to enforce
property rights: his ability to abuse this very power and to extort his subjects even more severely than in a state
of anarchy. See, for instance, Barzel (2000, 2002), Acemoglu et al. (2004), Myerson (2008) and Shen (2007),
who also reviews this literature. Moreover, a competition for the position of enforcer of property rights may
become an additional source of inefficiency and worsen the outcome compared to anarchy (Skaperdas 2002).
Leeson (2007b) describes and analyses the historical institutions by which pirates avoided being subject to
predation by their captain.
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lowing efficient management of a renewable resource, essentially preventing the group from
overfishing. A second example comes from the trade relationships in late precolonial times
between stationary producers in the interior of Central Africa and traders that visited the
producer sites in caravans. Leeson (2007a) argues that the transfer of resources in advance
from the trader to the producer that was very common in these relationships was a means
of overcoming a hold-up problem. In the absence of credit, the traders would be inclined
to use their power to plunder, rather than compensate the producers adequately, which, in
turn, would induce the producers to minimize the production that could be taken from them.
An upfront transfer of resources (credit) from the trader to the producer can solve the hold-
up problem. Our analysis follows similar lines. Our theory relies on the existence of a key
player whose gift giving is instrumental for coordination on an efficient equilibrium.
A third line of related research studies voluntary contributions to collective goods. This
research identified at least four different motivations for making own contributions. A con-
tributor may benefit from an increase in the amount of the public good that is provided.9
A contributor may like the feeling of doing something good; Andreoni (1990) referred to
this motivation as the warm glow of giving. Contributions to the public good may be in-
strumental for reaching other goals; Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) and Glazer and Konrad
(1996) suggested that observably contributing to a public good may convey information to
others and this may generate other benefits. Finally, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) introduced
the role of self-image as a possible motivation for charitable giving. In our framework an-
other motivation emerges: if individual contributions do conform with social norms, the
non-cooperative outcome is peaceful. Otherwise societal conflict is induced and makes all
players worse off. Hence individual contributions to group effort occur “in the shadow of
conflict” (Hirshleifer 1994). Hirshleifer advances the much more general and provocative
proposition that “cooperation, with a few obvious exceptions, occurs only in the shadow of
conflict”.
Our analysis is also related to research on the relationship between inter-group conflict
and rules that govern the behavior of members of the same group vis-a-vis each other. Nitzan
(1991) and Davis and Reilly (1999) consider the implications of different rules governing a
peaceful distribution of resources inside the group for the willingness of group members to
make voluntary contributions to group effort. These rules and the peaceful distribution inside
the group are taken as exogenously given in these frameworks. Their work shows that merit
rules, if they can be enforced, can supply important incentives for controlling free-riding.
Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), Wärneryd (1998) and Müller and Wärneryd (2001) highlight
that peaceful allocation rules inside the group cannot be taken for granted. A peaceful merit
rule may be a desirable incentive system from the group’s perspective, but in many con-
texts such rules cannot be enforced. In this case hierarchies of conflict may emerge, with a
conflict between groups being followed by a conflict among the members of the victorious
group for the prize.10 We as well consider an inter-group contest with possible free-riding
of group members, that is followed by a strong intra-group contest about the allocation of
the winner’s prize. However, we show that these two activities may “incentivize” players
mutually; efficient contributions to group effort and peaceful settlement of internal conflict
may then be complementary equilibrium outcomes.
9See, e.g., McGuire (1974), Hirshleifer (1983), Cornes (1993) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) for seminal con-
tributions in this formal context.
10This structure has been studied further by Glazer (2002) who discusses the cost and benefit of group mem-
bers who are highly efficient fighters. They benefit the group in the conflict with rival groups, but they also
appropriate a larger share in whatever the group wins.
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In political science there has been careful discussion about whether, and how, violent con-
flict can or cannot be avoided in the context of the theory of rational approaches to studying
war. From this literature it turns out (see, e.g., Fearon 1995) that asymmetric information
and commitment problems are the keys to explaining why conflict may take place, despite
its obvious inefficiency compared to a peaceful settlement. However, Slantchev (2003) ex-
plains how the occurrence of multiple equilibria and differences in the desirability of reach-
ing a particular equilibrium, together with expectations about what action triggers which
equilibrium may lead to actual conflict. Conceptually, Slantchev’s analysis is close to ours.
Slantchev uses the framework of multiple equilibria to explain why wasteful conflict may
emerge in a complete information world with non-cooperative bargaining. We use it to ex-
plain how (by using the conflict equilibria as credible threats) efficient cooperation and dis-
tributional harmony inside a group may emerge.
3 Inside the clan
Consider a clan that has n members who constitute the set N . This clan owns some income
V = 1. The allocation of this income among its members is governed by an appropriation
game in which contest efforts decide about the allocation of the prize, and in which the
timing of the choices of contest efforts is endogenous. Prior to this appropriation game, in
a first stage, G1, one designated player 1 is allowed to distribute non-negative payments
(a2, a3, . . . an) to the other group members. We denote




This player owns sufficient resources to make these payments, where aj ∈ [0,V ] can be
assumed without restricting generality; in fact a, the total amount this player transfers to
the other players, can be restricted to be less than V . We call player 1 the big man. (Later
in this section we will show, that this has to be the strongest member of the clan, i.e., he
may be viewed as the first claimant of the clans’s income V , who has to defend it in a
contest against the other clan members unless he redistributes it appropriately.) Payments
are fully unconditional in the following sense: members who receive a payment do not,
and cannot, promise anything in exchange for the payment, and simply follow their own
narrow interests in subsequent decision making. These payments also do not alter the set of
possible actions to be taken by any clan member in the future. For simplicity, we assume
that these payments are public information; all payments are observed by all members.11
Note, however, that payments can change the behavior of a player who is indifferent about
his own future actions, or change players’ expectations if there are multiple equilibria in
the continuation game. The payments may therefore drive the selection between a peaceful
equilibrium and violent fights inside the clan.
Stages G2–G4 describe the allocation of the prize in an all-pay auction with endogenous
timing, building on Baik and Shogren (1992), Baik (1994, 2005) and Leininger (1993). The
cornerstone of this allocation rule is a contest success function that maps clan members’
11This is mainly to be able to continue with a game with complete information. For the sake of the argument,
it would be sufficient if each clan member observed his own aj .
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effort choices into win probabilities.12 Let clan member i choose effort xi . The probability
pi that i wins the conflict is a function of all contestants’ efforts,
pi = pi(x1, x2, . . . xn). (2)
Denote x¯ ≡ maxk∈N {xk}. If xi = x¯ > xj for all j ∈ N − {i}, then pi = 1 and pj = 0 for all
j = i. If there are several players who have chosen the same, highest effort, x¯, we assume
a tie-breaking rule that is outlined later. The three stages of this appropriation conflict game
are as follows.
First, in stage G2, each member decides about the timing of his own choice of contest
effort. There are two different points in time, early (e) and late (l). Each clan member must
decide whether to make his effort choice at one of these points of time. If he chooses e, he
cannot reduce or increase his effort choice at a later point in time l. Hence, clan members
who choose e give members who choose l the opportunity to react to their effort choices.
This formal modeling simply means, that any clan member can make a strategic precommit-
ment to the level of effort. This may take the form of a directly imposed order of moves or
occur indirectly through some other variable that will influence the ex post capacity to ex-
pend effort. Members who precommit are modelled as choosing e; they become Stackelberg
leaders with respect to all who keep their options open and choose l.13
In stage G3, the point in time e is reached. At this point all observe their own and others’
choices of timing.14 Anyone who decided to make his effort choice at e chooses his xi
simultaneously with all others who made this same timing decision. Effort cost is quadratic
in effort, and we denote i’s cost as
Ci(xi) = cix2i . (3)
Clan members can, but need not, be symmetric. Generally we will assume that they may
differ with respect to their cost of generating contest effort, and consider them sorted and
numbered such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. Note that this together with the description of stage
G1 implies that the big man has the lowest cost of contest effort.15
In stage G4, the point of time l is reached. All observe the effort choices made by clan
members who made this choice at time e. All others now decide simultaneously about their
12This contest success function is widely used. Alcalde and Dahm (2010) showed that this function is payoff
equivalent to a very broad class of contest success functions.
13To illustrate, consider a clan which receives some amount of outside income which is contested among clan
members, but in which each clan member also owns and tills his own piece of land. Let each clan member
have two units of time, say, two months, before the winter season starts. He needs one month for tilling the
ground, leaving him at most one month’s time to engage in intra-group conflict. A clan member who does not
till his ground in the first month will need to do this in the second month, as otherwise he sacrifices one year’s
return on his land. So he is committed not to spend any time and effort on contesting in the second month.
Accordingly, a clan member who uses the entire first month for tilling the ground, has maximal capacity
to expend contest effort, as he can choose how much of the second month to spend on contesting the clan‘s
income. Hence, a clan member can precommit to any effort level or time spent in the contest by letting quietly
pass a respective amount of time of the first month before he starts tilling his land.
14Note that this assumption is not needed. For the results in Proposition 1 to hold it is necessary only that the
choice of e or l becomes common knowledge among all clan members prior to l, which is consistent with
the idea that a choice of e essentially means that a player delays mandatory duties to the future, and hence,
commits to not using this future time for producing contest effort.
15Our results can be generalized to cost functions other than (3), but we constrain the analysis to this para-
metric case because it yields simple closed form solutions and allows for a simple ordering in terms of group
members’ effort costs.
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own efforts. The cost of a given amount of effort is the same whether chosen at e or at l
and is described by the quadratic cost function (3). Recall that members who chose time
e cannot revise their effort choices at time l. Once all effort choices are made, the prize is
allocated according to the contest success function (2).
For situations in which several clan members expend the same effort we adopt tie-
breaking rules which are discussed at length in Konrad and Leininger (2007). The following
lemma describes the equilibrium of the subgame starting in stage G3.
Lemma 1 The subgame starting at stage G3 has unique equilibrium payoffs for any given
choices tj ∈ {e, l}. Payoffs are characterized as follows:






1 − ∑nj=2 aj if t1 = l and tj = e for all j = 2, . . . n
1 − c1
cjmin
− ∑nj=2 aj if t1 = l and tj = l for some j = 2, . . . n
with cjmin ≡ min{cj |tj = l, j = 1}
1 − c1
c2
− ∑nj=2 aj if t1 = e.
(5)
The result is proven in Konrad and Leininger (2007), who combine and extend results of
Baye et al. (1996) and Kaplan et al. (2003). Intuitively, if t1 = l and tj = e for all j = 2, . . . n,
then it makes no sense for j to expend positive effort, as any effort that costs j less than
the value of the prize will be overbid by player 1 in the last round. Player 1 wins without
any significant effort and his payoff equals the value of the prize, minus his unconditional
payments from stage G1. Moreover, players 2, . . . n receive nothing but the unconditional
payment aj . This explains the first line in (5). A similar argument applies whenever player 1
chooses t1 = l. All players who choose tj = e will not spend positive effort, because they
cannot win a positive payoff by any positive effort choice. However, player 1 will be in a
contest with other players who also chose tj = l. Given xj = 0 by all players who choose
tj = e, the contest essentially reduces to a simultaneous contest among the group of players
k who chose tk = l. The equilibrium outcome of this simultaneous contest is well known.
Only the two players with the lowest cost parameter bid positive effort, which are player 1
and player jmin. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and some of the prize will be dis-
sipated. For quadratic cost, c1
cjmin
is the share that is dissipated. Finally, if player 1 chooses
t1 = e, one can distinguish two cases. If j = 2 chooses tj = l, then player 1 with the lowest
cost can pre-empt player 2 by a sufficiently high bid x1 = 1√c2 , which just yields the payoff
(1 − c1
c2
). If, instead, j = 2 chooses tj = e, then things are more complicated and the equi-
librium strategies take into account that players with tk = l may overbid low effort levels,
but the same intuition goes through: j = 2 is the main competitor for player 1 and induces
a dissipation equal to c1
c2
. In particular, j = 1 can always attain at least (1 − c1
c2
) by a choice
x1 = 1/√c2, as no other player will ever reasonably choose a higher effort. This limits his
payoff from below, and, with some formal analysis, one can also show that this also limits
his effort from above (see Konrad and Leininger 2007). The bidding of players at stage l can
be interpreted as an all-pay auction with a minimal bid requirement (namely, submit a bid at
least as high as the highest bid from stage e). Perhaps surprisingly, bidding in the first stage
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l also reduces to an all-pay auction with a minimal bid requirement (namely, submit a bid
at least as high as the highest individually rational bid of the player with the least cost, who
moves at l).
Note that all players j = 2, . . . n are fully indifferent with respect to their choice of tim-
ing. Their overall payoff is equal to the unconditional payment aj , and their payoff from
participating in the contest is zero in expectation and independent of their timing. Their
choices matter for player 1’s payoff, and if he could influence their behavior, he would have
a strictly positive willingness to pay for making them choose tj = e.
Consider now stage G2.
Lemma 2 For player 1 the choice of t1 = l is a weakly dominant decision in the following
sense:
(i) For any timing decisions t−1 = (t2, . . . , tn) by players 2 to n there is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the full game with t∗ = (l, t2, . . . , tn)
(ii) For any t−1 = (e, t3, . . . , tn) the decision t1 = l is the unique equilibrium choice of
player 1.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows from Proposition 2 in Konrad and Leininger (2007).
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 together suggest that the continuation game consisting of stages
G2–G4 has at least 2n−1 equilibria. In each of these equilibria player 1 chooses t1 = l, but this
choice can go along with any combination (t2, . . . , tn) by the other players. The payoff for
player j, with j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, is aj for all equilibria. The payoff for player 1 is highest and
equal to 1 −∑nj=2 aj , if (t2, . . . , tn) = (e, . . . , e), and lowest and equal to 1 − c1c2 −
∑n
j=2 aj ,
if (t2, . . . , tn) = (l, t3, . . . , tn). Note, that player 1 is indifferent between t1 = e and t1 = l if
t2 = l; hence there are also equilibria in which player 1 chooses e, but these do not lead to
new equilibrium payoff vectors.
In contrast, each of the players j = 2, . . . n is fully indifferent with respect to his own
choice of timing and the choice of timing by all other players. The choice of timing tj
can therefore depend on any event or action that is observable at the beginning of G2; for
instance on the payments made to group members. We denote this relationship as
tj = τj (a2, a3, . . . an). (6)
This directly leads to
Proposition 1 Define A ≡ {(a2, . . . an)|a < c1c2 and aj ≥ 0 for j = 2, . . . n}. Then, for any
a ∈ A, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 chooses a
at the first stage.
Proof Let t1 ≡ l, but
τj (a) =
{
e if a = a∗
l if a = a∗. (7)
By Lemmas 1 and 2, this behavior yields πj = aj for all j = 2, . . . n in the subgame perfect
equilibrium, independent of j ′s choice of timing, and payoff π1 = 1 − a∗ if a = a∗ and




a = (0,0, . . .0) if a∗ > c1
c2
. 
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Groups may overcome the problem of wasteful internal fights about the distribution of
the group income between its members in a fully non-cooperative game without repeated in-
teraction, without reputation building, and without relying on the rules of a non-cooperative
bargaining game. This peaceful equilibrium is compatible with a large number of distribu-
tions of the group income. The big man receives at least what he could obtain from fighting,
and any division of the ‘peace dividend’ c1
c2
is compatible with Proposition 1.16
Note that Proposition 1 implicitly assumed that the role as big man was assigned to the
player who is the strongest fighter, as c1 = minj∈N {cj }. A player j with cj > c1 cannot be the
big man. If he were to make positive transfers a > 0, he could never retrieve them. His payoff
from the intra-group contest in any equilibrium would be 0. Hence any sort of competition
for the role of big man would see player 1 prevail. The sequencing of timing decisions
has two effects: it not only yields equilibria in pure strategies, but also an “efficiency gain”
if players move in an appropriate order. The latter effect relies on the possibility that the
strongest player can use his advantage against weaker players through their expectations
(i.e. without having to exert it) if he moves late (and the others early). If he moves early (or
others join him in moving late), he actually has to exert his greater strength by making the
largest effort bid. This seriously limits the potential of any player other than the strongest of
becoming the big man.
4 Collective action
One of the quintessential public goods problems in the context of primitive societies is the
collective provision of effort to defend the clan’s territory, or to expand this territory at the
expense of rivals or enemies. The formation of clans, groups or states facilitates the provision
of collective goods.17 Returns to scale, or the importance of country size for relative strength
in international conflict, has been one of the key drivers of a process of consolidation and
the formation of ever larger units.18
The ‘external’ conflict. Consider the competition between the clan and an enemy for a
prize that can again be seen as an amount of resources, e.g., money or some homogenous
universal good that is valued at V = 1. The contest follows the rules of an all-pay auction
similar to the rules of the possible intra-clan conflict. Let yE be the total contest effort chosen
by the enemy, and the enemy’s cost of providing this effort
DE(yE) = cEy2E. (8)
16This indeterminacy is not uncommon, of course, in other contexts, e.g., the cake-eating problem. The
main difference is that we do not make any assumption about procedural rules that the players agree to, and
explicitly allow for resource wasteful appropriation effort here.
17The provision of fundamental public goods such as internal and external security is clearly a fundamental
problem under anarchy. A large share of the literature considers the origin of the state as a type of business
model: players with coercive power settle and become what is called “stationary bandits”: they ruled over
people and extract rents from them (see, e.g., Oppenheimer 1908; Holcombe 2004). Eventually they improve
this business concept by providing public goods.
18Riker (1966, pp. 2–3, 8–9) emphasizes military considerations as central for the formation of federations,
and illustrates this using examples starting from the federation of city states in Ancient Greece. The theory
of the optimal size of nations by Spolaore and Alesina (2002) attributes the recent breakup of larger nation
states to the decline in the importance of international military conflict in most modern, post cold-war times.
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Further, let each clan member decide on his own contribution yj to the clan’s effort, which
causes a cost of effort to this member that is equal to19
Dj(yj ) = cjy2j . (9)





This simple form of aggregating individual efforts is frequently assumed in the literature on
private provision of public goods.20 Our mechanism for implementing efficient contributions
can easily be adapted to a whole class of other functions.21
The contest between the clan and the enemy is again governed by the same type of contest
success function: the clan or the enemy wins the prize, depending on who expends higher
effort. A fair coin decides who wins the prize if yC = yE .
From the perspective of member i, any contribution yi to the aggregate level of yC is a
contribution to a clan-wide pure public good. We first determine what the combinations of
effort (y1, . . . yn) are that are collectively optimal from the perspective of the clan. Then we
show that this collectively optimal behavior can be implemented as a fully non-cooperative
equilibrium, taking into consideration that the prize must be allocated among the clan mem-
bers if the clan wins the prize, and that this involves some intra-clan conflict as studied in
the previous section.
Optimal collective effort in the inter-group conflict. Suppose that the clan manages to co-
ordinate on a peaceful equilibrium once it wins the prize. In this case, the clan collectively
values the prize by its nominal value, which we normalized to V = 1. The optimal choice
of the clan’s effort yC will generally depend on the enemy’s choice of effort. However, the
following proposition determines how a given amount of aggregate effort can be generated
in an effort cost minimizing way.
Proposition 2 If the clan generates a given amount of aggregate effort y in a cost minimiz-
ing way, the clan’s aggregate effort cost is equal to





19The use of the same cj in (3) and (9) is mainly for notational parsimony. Clan members may differ in their
relative abilities for internal and external fights, but often these abilities should be expected to be positively
correlated.
20McGuire (1974) introduced this setup when studying collective action. The seminal paper using this tech-
nology is Bergstrom et al. (1986). For the case with contribution substitutability but convex individual con-
tribution cost see Esteban and Ray (2001). For further discussion and a survey see Batina and Ihori (2005).
21Other technologies are Hirshleifer’s (1983) “weakest link” model with yC = min(y1, . . . , yn), or the “best
shot” model with yC = max(y1, . . . , yn), or the case of a discontinuous public good such that the public
good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions exceeds a given threshold as in Bagnoli and Lipman
(1989). In some of these cases an efficient non-cooperative outcome exists already if there is no threat of an
intra-group conflict.
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Proof The cost function DC(y) of the clan is obtained as the solution to the maximization
problem yC = y1 + y2 + · · · + yn → max subject to ∑nj=1 cjy2j ≤ D. The solution requires
D′C(y) = 2ciy∗i (y) for all i = 1, . . . n. (12)


















Integrating and taking into consideration that DC(0) = 0 yields (11). 
Note that c as defined in (11) decreases if the clan grows by an additional member. This
monotonicity holds whatever are the current size of the clan and the combination of cost
parameters. Large clans have a lower cost of a given amount of effort in an external conflict
if this amount of effort is efficiently provided: if there are more clan members, each member
needs to contribute a smaller portion of the given clan effort, and, with increasing marginal
cost, the aggregate cost is decreasing in the number of clan members.
Also note that the cost parameter c of the clan cost function DC(y) equals 1n times the
harmonic mean h(c1, . . . , cn) of the individual cost function parameters:
c = h(c1, . . . , cn)
n
.
Since h(c1, . . . , cn) > min{c1, . . . , cn} we conclude that
1
n
h(c1, . . . , cn) < min{c1, . . . , cn}.
This is a technological source of feasible “efficiency gains” for the clan beyond the big
man’s strength. These gains increase in n and the strength of any new member of the clan.
Proposition 2 means that clan member j has to contribute effort y∗j (y) = ccj y2 at individ-
ual cost c2
cj
y in the efficient provision of clan effort y. That is, all members have to contribute
and stronger members have to contribute more than weaker members.
The lower cost translates into an advantage in the external conflict with an enemy if the
clan can manage to mobilize each member to contribute the efficient amount of effort. Let
the clan maximize
πC(y) = FE(y) − DC(y) = Prob(yE < y) − DC(y) (14)
and, similarly, the enemy maximize,
πE(y) = FC(y) − DE(y) = Prob(yC < y) − DE(y). (15)
Then the following holds:
Proposition 3 Consider the all-pay auction contest between the clan and an enemy for a
prize which they both value at 1. If the clan can choose its aggregate effort efficiently in
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A proof relies on the standard result for an all-pay auction between two contestants with
the same valuations and quadratic cost functions (8) and (11).
The proposition shows that the clan can win a positive expected payoff in the wasteful
conflict with the enemy if
cE > c. (17)
This condition defines the potential superiority of the clan in the conflict with the enemy.
As c depends on the number and cost distribution of clan members, this superiority is en-
dogenous with respect to the composition of the clan.
Equilibrium collective action. The external conflict takes place in a stage W(ar). As dis-
cussed above, if the clan and its enemy choose their efforts yC and yE in order to maximize
their respective payoffs, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies in which the effort choices are
drawn from random variables with cumulative density functions FC and FE , respectively.
Efficient provision of a given effort level yC by the clan requires a particular, unique alloca-
tion of efforts, (y1, . . . , yn), among its members. If yC is a draw from a random distribution,
it is therefore important for efficiency that the individual effort choices and the choice of yC
are perfectly correlated. In order to make this feasible, we allow for the following coordina-






0 for θ ≤ 0
cEθ
2 for θ ∈ (0, 1√
cE
)




This θ is observed by all clan members (but not by the enemy) before they freely and si-
multaneously make their individual effort choices yj . Once all clan members and the enemy
have chosen their efforts, θ and all effort choices are observed by all players. If the enemy
wins, the game is over.
If the clan wins, then the clan members enter into stages G1–G4 as discussed in the
section on internal conflict.
Proposition 4 Let the clan be potentially superior to the enemy in the sense of (17). If
c1 − c2 is sufficiently close to zero, then a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which the
clan can implement the externally efficient efforts and a peaceful distribution of rents from
war.
Proof Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 characterize the equilibria of the subgames consisting of
stages G2–G4. Each clan member except the big man is indifferent whether to choose tj = e
or tj = l. The choices and the equilibrium of G2–G4 can therefore depend on the history
of the game at the beginning of G2. At G2, a history consists of a θ , choices of efforts in
the inter-group conflict by the clan members, (y1, . . . , yn), an effort choice by the enemy,
yE , an outcome of the contest in which the clan wins the prize, and a vector of transfers
(a2, . . . , an) that was chosen and paid by the big man in stage G1. Hence,
ti = τi(θ, y1, . . . yn, yE, a2, . . . , an) (19)
replaces (6).
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Consider the following candidate choice of timing in the continuation equilibrium at G2









for the class of histories with
yj (θ) = ccj θ ≡ y∗j (θ) for all j
and a = a∗ with
a∗j ≥ c2cEcj for all j = 2 . . . n
and a∗ < 1 − c2
c1cE
(l, l, l, . . . , l) for any other history that reaches G2,
(20)
and the equilibrium payoffs determined by these choices as characterized in Proposition 1.
To confirm that (20) can induce an efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall
game, consider first G1 which is reached if the clan was victorious in the external conflict.
If at least one clan member deviated from y∗j (θ), then t = (l, l, . . . l), independent of a.




− c1y21 for j = 1
and
−cjy2j for j = 2, . . . n.
(21)
If all clan members have chosen y∗j (θ), the big man’s choice of a determines the equilibrium
outcome of the subgame in stages G2–G4. For a = a∗, the payoffs are
π1 − c1(y∗1 (θ))2 = 1 − c1c2 − a − c1(y∗1 (θ))2
and
πj − cj (y∗j (θ))2 = aj − cj (y∗j (θ))2 for j = 2, . . . n,
(22)
and, among these transfer payments, the big man’s payoff is maximal for a = (0,0, . . . ,0).
Alternatively, the big man can choose a = a∗. This yields payoffs
1 − a∗ − c1(y∗1 (θ))2 for j = 1
and
a∗j − cj (y∗j (θ))2 for j = 2, . . . n.
(23)
The big man chooses a∗ if
c1
c2
− a∗ ≥ 0. (24)
Note that a∗ < 1− c2
c1cE
in (20) and (24) are simultaneously fulfilled for potential superiority
if c1/c2 is sufficiently close to 1 and hence c1 − c2 small.














is the enemy’s optimal reply to F ∗C(y) = F(θ) as any yE ∈ [0, 1√cE ) yields the enemy an
expected payoff of zero and higher effort yE yields negative expected payoff.
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Taking F ∗E and the equilibrium effort choices y∗k (θ) of all other clan members k = j as
given, j = 1 chooses between y∗j (θ) which yields payoff
−cj (y∗j (θ))2 + FE(θ)a∗j , (26)
and arg maxyj =y∗j (θ){−cj (yj )2} = 0. The latter makes use of aj = 0 if yj (θ) = y∗j (θ), and
of j ’s payoff from the actual intra-clan conflict being zero for j = 1. The two possible
candidates for an optimum are yj = 0 or yj = y∗j (θ). Investment level y∗j (θ) is chosen if









for j = 2, . . . , n. As the right-hand side of (27) is increasing in θ , condition (27) is strongest
for θ = 1√
cE





Taking F ∗E and the equilibrium effort choices y∗j (θ) of all j = 1 as given, j = 1 chooses
between y∗1 (θ), by which he attains a payoff
−c1(y∗1 (θ))2 + F ∗E(θ)(1 − a∗), (29)
which is his payoff in the efficient equilibrium in the intra-clan contest which results from a
choice of a∗, and the payoff from y1 = y∗1 (θ) that maximizes






The characterization of the payoff (30) uses the fact that a deviation from y∗1 (θ) will in-
duce a = 0 and the equilibrium with violent intra-clan conflict. The choice problem of the
big man therefore reduces to the choice between y∗1 (θ) = cc1 θ and arg maxy1 =y∗1 (θ){−c1y21 +
((1 − c
cE
) + c(θ − c
c1
θ + y1)2)(1 − c1c2 )}. Let c2 − c1 = δ. The argument that maxi-
mizes (30) tends to y1 = 0 as δ → 0, and player 1’s maximized payoff converges to-
wards zero as δ → 0. Accordingly, the candidate equilibrium effort y1 = y∗1 (θ) is chosen
if −c1(y∗1 (θ))2 + F ∗E(θ)(1 − a∗) > 0. Inserting the equilibrium values y∗1 (θ) = cc1 θ and
F ∗E(θ) = (1 − ccE ) + cθ2 yields the condition












is monotonically increasing in θ , the condition (31) is strongest for θ = 1√
cE
,
for which it becomes
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> 0, or, equivalently, 1− c
cE
> 0, which is identical
with the condition of potential superiority. 
Potential superiority of the clan is one prerequisite from the external conflict structure for
sustainability of the efficient effort in equilibrium. Another prerequisite from the internal
conflict structure is limited potential superiority of the big man inside the clan. A strong
“deputy” player 2 of the big man 1 not only increases competitiveness in the external contest,
but also poses a larger threat (see (30)) in the internal contest, which stabilizes the efficient
equilibrium.
Also note that the incentive compatibility constraints (28) and (32) for an efficient equi-
librium mean that any resource distribution (1−a∗, a∗2 , . . . , a∗n) in such an equilibrium must
award at least a share of c
cE
of the resource in accordance with ‘merit’: the minimal individ-
ual requirements c2
cEcj
, j = 1, . . . , n, add up to c
cE
. Only a part of (1 − c
cE
) can be distributed
otherwise. E.g. Nitzan (1991) in a different context of collective rent-seeking exogenously
imposed “mixed sharing rules” of the form





i.e. a share t of the resource is distributed according to (relative) effort and the remaining
part is distributed on egalitarian grands (si denotes player i’s share). Our analysis shows that
a peaceful efficient solution for the clan implicity (and endogenously) imposes t > c
cE
; in
particular, if potential superiority is weak and hence c close to cE , there is little room for
egalitarian considerations.
The case c1 = c2 is an interesting benchmark case. The incentives to coordinate on the
peaceful outcome are largest here; coordination is feasible at, and in the neighborhood of this
benchmark case. Intuitively, at c1 = c2, if coordination fails, the big man does not receive
a positive payoff even if the clan wins the prize in the external conflict, and his incentives
to pursue a “stand alone” strategy in which he cheats on effort in the external conflict, and
then also does not make positive transfers, are minimal, because his payoff in the resulting
fighting equilibrium is zero. The opposite benchmark case is obtained if c1  c2, and c ≈ cE .
In this case the big man does not gain much from coordinated action, as the overall prize
the clan wins from coordinated action is negligible. It turns out that the efficient coordinated
equilibrium cannot be supported for all cost parameter values.22
22Assume, for instance, that cE = 1 +  and consider the limiting case with  → 0. Assume further that
N = {1,2,3}, with c1 = 2, c2 = c3 = 4. Note that c = 1. Note further that the maximum effort by the enemy
is yEmax = 1, as DE(1) = 1 = V . If the members of N play efficiently, the maximum θ = 1 is generated




2 = y∗3 = 14 . Hence, the minimum that needs to be paid to 2 and 3
is a∗2 = a∗3 = c2(y∗2 (1))2 = 4 116 = 14 . The big man ends up with a rent that equals 1 − 2( 12 )2 − 2a∗2 =
1 − 12 − 24 = 0. Now consider a big man who defaults, given θ = 1, and chooses y1 = 0. In this case, N
wins with a probability FE(1/2) = c( 12 )2 = 1/4, and, once the clan wins the prize, the big man receives an
expected contest payoff in the intra-clan contest that equals (1 − c1c2 ) = 1/2. Hence, the payoff is zero if the
big man behaves according to the equilibrium candidate of Proposition 4, but receives 1/8 if he defaults.
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Proposition 4 characterizes rules for contributions to the collective action and transfers
from the big man to the other clan members that serve as a norm. If all players obey the
norm, the outcome is efficient from the perspective of the group. Moreover, all players have
an incentive to obey the norm. The norm is also self-enforcing.
Many other norms can also be sustained as an equilibrium by the fact that the players
can reach the peaceful equilibrium only if they obey the norm. These norms may support an
equilibrium in which the behavior of the clan members is suboptimal from the clan perspec-
tive. An example would be to replace y∗j (θ) = ccj θ by some y∗j = ccj θ + δ for sufficiently
small δ. This choice makes the clan win the contest with probability 1. It also causes some
excessive effort cost. But, if δ is small, and if this behavior is a necessary condition for coor-
dinating on the peaceful equilibrium, this inefficient norm can be sustained. This reproduces
an important property of norms. Norms are excessively stable in the sense that they may
become obsolete or inferior to some alternative norm but may still continue to be obeyed.
Finally, the distribution of cost functions inside the clan is important, but the number of
clan members also matters. Consider, for instance, a given cE and a set of players who all
have the same cost parameter c0  cE . As
lim







a sufficiently large clan exists such that cE > c, making the payoff of the clan in the peaceful
non-cooperative equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 4 strictly positive.23
5 Conclusions
Experience from everyday life tells us that if individual members of a group do not do their
“duty”, this can upset the peaceful regime that may otherwise prevail inside the group. If
the norms about social behavior within the group are violated by some group members not
contributing what is considered to be their appropriate share of contributions to the common
interest, this may induce other members of the group to reconsider given predispositions of
intra-group distribution of resources and may cause quarrelling among the group members.
Such quarrelling dissipates resources and is collectively disadvantageous. In turn, anticipa-
tion of quarrelling as a consequence of neglecting own duties may give the group members
an incentive to behave responsibly. Hence, the fear of possible fighting and resource wast-
ing conflict inside the group may stabilize an efficient outcome in which group members
voluntarily contribute to group specific public goods.
In this paper we provide a microeconomic underpinning for this everyday life experience
within the strictly non-cooperative framework of a finite multi-stage game. Multiple equilib-
ria can exist with respect to the distribution of resources within the group, some of which are
peaceful and some of which are characterized by resource wasting conflict. If the selection
of equilibrium is driven by the group members’ conduct with respect to their contributions
to a group specific public good, this can induce fully efficient voluntary contributions to the
public good. Our result is derived in the context of stateless societies. It hence also consti-
tutes a contribution to the economics of anarchy by showing that anarchy and efficiency are
compatible.
23Note that (35) does not imply that maximum sized clans yield the highest per-capita payoffs for its mem-
bers. The clan size that maximizes per-capita payoff is typically finite, given that the maximum clan income
is finite.
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